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Colo. Rev. Stat §38-22-106( 1) (1973) 8 
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties are in general agreement as to the material 
facts. However, respondent Guaranty Savings and Loan 
Association ("Guaranty") unnecessarily complicates the issues 
with immaterial facts regarding the various trust deeds. (Resp. 
Br. at 8-9.) The preliminary trust deeds in April and June of 
1983 were both released and superseded by the final trust deed 
to Guaranty recorded September 15, 1983. (R. 1152.) Guaranty's 
entire interest in the resort property is now held by virtue of 
the September trust deed alone. Guaranty's priority claim in 
the district court was based on the September trust deed (R. 
1266, 1272), and the district court's ruling was based on the 
September trust deed (Appellant's Add. 2, 5). Accordingly, in 
deciding the relative lien priorities in this appeal, it should 
be kept clearly in mind that Guaranty's lien attachment date is 
September 15, 1983. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Architects have a valid lien for their services, and both 
the language and purpose of the lien priority statute require 
that it attach from the date the architectural work is begun. 
In any event, the architects' liens relate back to visible 
construction pre-dating the lender's trust deed. Neither the 
1982 foreclosure judgment on the fee parcel nor the temporary 
suspension of construction bars relation back of the architects1 
liens to prior visible construction on the resort Property. 
Guaranty is precluded from challenging the extent of the 
property covered by the architects' liens because it failed to 
file a cross-appeal challenging the district court's ruling that 
the liens applied to the entire property. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: ARCHITECTS' LIENS ATTACH ON THE DATE THE 
ARCHITECTURAL WORK IS COMMENCED. 
A. Utah Law 
Guaranty does not dispute that architects are entitled to 
a lien for the value of their services whether or not on-site 
construction is ever commenced. See U.C.A. §38-1-3; Zions First 
National Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 464 P.2d 387, 388 
(1970). Guaranty argues that the architect's lien, as with all 
mechanics liens, attaches only upon commencement of visible, 
on-site improvements. (Resp. Br. at 12.) However, that 
argument runs contrary to the plain language of the lien 
priority statute and expands this Court's decisions beyond their 
intended limits. 
U.C.A. §38-1-5 clearly provides for different lien 
attachment points depending upon the type of work being done. 
It says that liens "take effect" or attach at "the time of 
commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground." 
Subsequent language in the statute makes the distinction even 
more clear, giving mechanics1 liens priority over mortgages that 
attached subsequently "to the time when the building, 
improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or first 
material furnished on the ground." Guaranty emphasizes the 
-2-
phrase "on the ground," but that phrase modifies only "material 
furnished," not "work begun." As noted in Zions, supra, the 
lien statute "was purposely broad in order to give a lien for 
the drawing of plats, plans, maps or specifications which is not 
done directly upon the property." 464 P.2d at 388, emp. added. 
Since architectural work is never done "on the ground," section 
38-1-5 must be construed to allow architects1 liens to attach 
when the architectural "work [is] begun." 
Guaranty surprisingly calls this a "tortured 
interpretation" of section 38-1-5 (Resp. Br. at 19 n.4), but 
that characterization more accurately describes Guaranty's 
proposed construction. Guaranty would rewrite the statute to 
favor lenders over laborers, to give all mechanics' liens effect 
from the date of "commencement of work on the ground." (Resp. 
Br. at 15.) But what is the attachment date of those statutory 
liens if on-site construction is never commenced? Guaranty 
proposes priority "from the date of recording of the lien 
itself" (Resp. Br. at 18); the only problem is, section 38-1-5 
says nothing about measuring priority from the date of filing. 
Such a drastic alteration of the statute must obviously be left 
to the Legislature. Thus, under Guaranty's interpretation of 
38-1-5, architects would have no lien protection where 
construction, for no fault of theirs, is never commenced, 
Note that Guaranty's quotation of section 38-1-5 is 
incomplete and omits the word "work" in the crucial phrase "work 
begun." (Resp. Br. at 12-13.) 
o 
a result directly contrary to the holding in Zions. And even 
where construction is commenced, Guaranty's interpretation of 
38-1-5 would require attachment of architects1 liens to be 
delayed beyond the time when their lienable services are 
performed and would thus result in treating architects 
2 
differently from all other lienholders under the statute. 
Guaranty argues that the "equal footing" doctrine 
embodied in section 38-1-10 precludes attachment of architects1 
liens from the date* of commencement of the architectural work 
because other mechanics' liens will attach at different times. 
(Resp. Br. at 29-31.) While section 38-1-5 provides for 
different points of lien attachment depending upon the type of 
lienable work performed, for purposes of lien priority relative 
to non-mechanicsf liens, all mechanics1 liens have the same 
priority. See First of Denver Mort. Investors v. C.N. Zundel 
and Associates, 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979.) Thus, equal 
Guaranty cites a law review comment in support of its 
position that no liens attach until visible construction 
commences. (Resp. Br. at 17.) However, Guaranty omitted the 
language to the contrary: 
Since a difficult factual determination must be made 
under the "visible to the eye" test, there is much 
uncertainty created in regard to the priority of 
mechanics' and mortgage liens. There is a definite need 
for a point in time upon which interested parties can 
rely for purposes of establishing priority, and it seems 
that the "visible to the eye" test does not fulfill this 
need. 
Comment, "The Utah Law of Mechanics' Liens," 1966 Utah L. Rev. 
181, 188. For architects' liens, that point in time is when the 
architectural work is commenced. 
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footing is preserved. Lenders with liens inferior to the 
mechanics1 liens will accordingly take steps to ensure that all 
mechanics1 lien holders are paid from the construction loan 
proceeds, a result consistent with the protective purpose of the 
mechanics1 lien law. (App. Br. at 7.) 
Neither does Utah case law go so far as to require 
visible, on-site construction before any mechanic's lien may 
attach. Guaranty relies primarily on Calder Bros. Co. v. 
Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982), and Western Mortgage Loan 
Corp. v. Cottonwood Constr. Co., 18 Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437 
(1967), for its visible construction argument; however, neither 
case stands for the proposition Guaranty asserts. In Calder 
Bros., the mechanics' liens were held inferior to the mortgage 
lien not because the mechanics' work was not visible on the 
site, but because the work was only "ordinary maintenance or 
cleanup work" and did not constitute "commencement of an 
improvement to the building." 652 P.2d at 924-25. Similarly, 
Western Mortgage held that the mechanics' liens on a particular 
home in a subdivision could not relate back to the installation 
of utility lines and roads for the entire subdivision, not 
because those general improvements were not visible, but because 
"[t]he erection of the home was separate and severable from the 
early work in developing the subdivision." 424 P.2d at 439. By 
contrast, the architects' work in the present case was extensive 
and detailed, covering every aspect of the long-term development 
of the entire resort property. It constituted an essential, 
-5-
integral part of the resort development. Therefore, the 
architects1 liens should have priority over Guaranty's trust 
deed without regard to commencement of on-site construction, as 
contemplated by 38-1-5. 
The prior decisions of this Court do recognize the notice 
function served by measuring certain mechanics' liens from the 
date of commencement of on-site construction or delivery of 
material "on the ground." However, those decision are not 
intended to be all-inclusive so as to preclude an architect's 
lien from attaching when the architectural work is begun. While 
Zions did not decide the relative priority of an architect's 
lien as against competing lien holders, it did hold that the 
architect's lien may attach prior to actual construction or 
furnishing of materials. In any event, lenders typically have 
actual notice of prior architectural work, as Guaranty concedes 
(Resp. Br. at 20), and as occurred in this case (App. Br. at 
16). Therefore, with respect to architects' liens, actual 
construction or furnishing of materials on the ground is not 
required to give lenders notice that an architect's lien has 
attached. With actual notice of an architect's lien, the lender 
can take the necessary steps or precautions to preserve its 
3 
first priority status. 
Guaranty asserts that architects should not expect 
statutory protection, but should protect themselves by demanding 
payment in advance or from the construction loan. (Resp. Br. at 
21 n.6.) However, Guaranty well knows the implausibility of 
advance payment on a project like this where the fees for 
architectural services run into the millions of dollars. As for 
payment from the loan proceeds, that is exactly what the 
architects expected and were promised, but were not given. 
-6-
Finally, Guaranty makes the policy argument that lender 
funds will dry up if architects' liens are given priority over 
subsequently recorded trust deeds. (Resp. Br. at 20 n.5.) 
However, that is pure conjecture and has not occurred in states 
like Colorado that give architects1 liens priority as of the 
date the architectural work is commenced. It is just as likely, 
if the trust deed is given priority, that architectural services 
f^r such developments will be unavailable because architects 
will refuse to work without assurance of future payment. The 
memorandum of "adverse effects" under an unrelated law, cited in 
Resp. Br. at 20 n.5, is not part of the record and may not be 
considered on this appeal. 
In sum, under the language of section 38-1-5 and this 
Court's decision in Zions, architects' liens attach and have 
priority from the date the architectural work is commenced. 
There is no Utah case or valid policy reason to the contrary. 
B. Other Jurisdictions 
Appellants' Brief, pp. 12-15, demonstrates that Utah's 
lien priority statute originates from Colorado, and that 
Colorado case law should therefore be persuasive in resolving 
this appeal. Guaranty argues that the Colorado statute is 
distinguishable and that Colorado case law should therefore not 
be followed. (Resp. Br. at 27-28.) However, the only 
distinction is that the Colorado statute gives all mechanics' 
liens priority from "the time of the commencement of work," 
while the Utah statute gives priority from "the time of the 
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commencement to do work c^r furnish materials on the ground." 
Cf. Colo. Rev. Stat. §38-22-106(1)(1973) with U.C.A. §38-1-5. 
Thus, the Utah statute merely adds an alternative attachment 
point, which has no effect on architects' liens. Colorado case 
law is accordingly relevant and persuasive. 
Regarding relevant case law from other jurisdictions, 
Guaranty attempts to snow the Court with decisions that are not 
on point. (Resp. Br. at 21-22.) Of the five cases on which 
Guaranty places primary reliance, three do not even deal with 
priority of architects' liens, and the statutes of four of the 
jurisdictions are materially distinguishable from Utah's. 
Williams & Works, Inc. v. Springfield Corp., 408 Mich. 732, 293 
N.W.2d 304, 305 (1980), holds that a lien for off-site 
engineering services is inferior to a mortgage under a statute 
requiring "commencement of said building or buildings, erection, 
structure or improvement." Reuben E. Johnson Co. v. Phelps, 279 
Minn. 107, 156 N.W.2d 247, 250-51 (1968), held that a mortgage 
has priority over liens for surveying work under a statute 
measuring priority "from the time the first item of material or 
labor is furnished upon the premises for the beginning of the 
improvement." And Clark v. General Electric Co., 243 Ark. 399, 
420 S.W.2d 830, 833 (1967), held that a mortgage has priority 
over liens for preliminary site preparation under a statute 
giving priority from the "commencement of the buildings or 
improvements." Walker v. Lytton Savings and Loan Ass'n, 84 Cal. 
Rptr. 521, 465 P.2d 497, 498-500 (1970), gives a mortgage lien 
-8-
priority over an architect's lien because the California 
priority statute measures lien attachment from "the time when 
the building, improvement, structure, or work of improvement . . 
. was commenced." Only Aladdin Heating Corp. v. Trustees, 93 
Nev. 257, 563 P.2d 82, 84 (1977), decides the issue of an 
architect's lien priority under a statute reasonably comparable 
to Utah's and Colorado's. However, the court's rationale for 
giving the trust deed priority was that architects' liens do not 
even exist until after commencement of the planned building, 
4 
which is directly contrary to this Court's holding in Zions. 
Thus, there is no majority and minority rule with regard 
to the relative priority of architects' liens. Each case 
necessarily turns on the precise wording of the priority statute 
of the particular jurisdiction. Utah's statute most closely 
resembles Colorado's; therefore, this Court should adopt the 
position of the Colorado courts in giving architects' liens 
priority from the date of commencement of the architectural work. 
Guaranty lists a string cite of additional cases from 
other jurisdictions supposedly holding that liens for 
preconstruction architectural and engineering services do not 
exist until commencement of visible, on-site construction. 
(Resp. Br. at 22 n.7.) However, existence or attachment of 
those liens prior to actual construction is not at issue in this 
appeal. Zions specifically held that an architect's lien 
attaches without regard to actual construction; therefore, that 
corollary issue is settled under Utah law. None of those cited 
cases decides the relative priority of an attached architect's 
lien vis-a-vis a lender's trust deed. 
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POINT II: THE NOVEMBER 1982 FORECLOSURE JUDGMENT ON THE FEE 
PROPERTY DOES NOT PRECLUDE RELATION BACK OF THE 
ARCHITECTS1 LIENS TO VISIBLE, PRE-FORECLOSURE 
IMPROVEMENTS ON THE LEASED AND PERMIT PROPERTIES. 
Guaranty argues that the November 1982 foreclosure 
judgment on the 110-acre fee parcel bars relation back of the 
liens for post-foreclosure work to any pre-foreclosure work on 
the fee parcel as well as the contiguous leased and permit 
parcels comprising another 4541 acres. (Resp. Br. at 31-33.) 
Regarding relation back to pre-foreclosure work on the fee 
property, Guaranty attempts to distinguish a foreclosure of 
liens from the release of liens illustrated in First of Denver, 
sujpra, and Duckett v. Olsen, 699 P. 2d 734 (Utah 1985). (See 
discussion in App. Br. at 18-19.) While there are obvious 
technical distinctions between a foreclosure and a release, they 
have no legal significance in resolving the relation back 
issue. In either circumstance, a lien for subsequent work 
relates back to the date of previous work for which the lien has 
been extinguished. 
Even assuming liens for post-foreclosure architectural 
work cannot relate back to pre-foreclosure work on the fee 
property, they can certainly relate back to pre-foreclosure work 
on the leased and permit parcels, which were unaffected by the 
foreclosure. (See App. Br. at 3 and Resp. Br. at 7-8 for 
discussion and documentation of pre-foreclosure work on leased 
and permit parcels.) Guaranty argues in response that "material 
abandonment" of the project precludes relation back to any 
pre-foreclosure work. (Resp. Br. at 32-34.) However, Heritage 
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never "abandoned" the project, and the district court found no 
abandonment. Visible work on the project was suspended for, at 
the most, five months following the November 1982 foreclosure. 
The purpose of the suspension was for Heritage to obtain 
long-term financing with which to reacquire the fee property and 
continue with the project. Aztec Engineering began surveying 
and staking the property in April of 1983, and architectural and 
construction work resumed in earnest after Heritage obtained 
additional financing in June of 1983. (App. Br. at 4; Resp. Br. 
at 9.) A five-month suspension of work on a twenty-year project 
cannot be considered a "material abandonment" of the project. 
Frank J. Klein & Sons, Inc. v. Laudeman, 270 Md. 152, 311 A.2d 
780, 784-86 (1973) (fifteen-month suspension of construction did 
not constitute abandonment). Guaranty's reliance on U.C.A. 
§38-1-11 is misplaced, as the issue here is not the timely 
filing of a lien after abandonment, see 57 C.J.S., Mechanics1 
Liens §144, but the relation back of a valid lien beyond a 
period of temporary cessation, see id. §180. Thus, under the 
facts here, the architects1 liens may relate back to the visible 
pre-foreclosure work on the leased and permit properties. 
Guaranty does not challenge relation back of the 
architects' liens to the visible post-foreclosure improvements 
on the property. (See App. Br. at 19-20.) 
- i i _ 
POINT III! RESPONDENTS ARE PRECLUDED FROM CHALLENGING THE 
EXTENT OF PROPERTY COVERED BY THE ARCHITECTS1 LIENS 
BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO FILE A CROSS-APPEAL. 
Guaranty argues that any liens held by the architects or 
other mechanics extend only to the 41 acres of leased property 
on which the resort headquarters was constructed, and not to the 
fee or permit properties. (Resp. Br. at 39-40.) This argument, 
of course, ignores the facts that (1) the architectural and 
engineering services pertained and inured to the benefit of all 
three parcels; and (2) even if the architects' liens take 
priority through relation back to visible construction, that 
construction occurred on all three parcels, not just the leased 
parcel. 
In any event, Guaranty is precluded from challenging the 
scope of the architects' liens because it failed to file a 
notice of cross-appeal. The district courts' Ruling states: 
The court notes that the architects and engineers do 
have valid lien rights for the work they have done 
subject to the priority determination as hereinabove 
made, and that those liens apparently affect the overall 
project and to the extent that they come subsequent to 
the phase 1 ruling would be valid liens applying to all 
of the property of the project. [Appellant's Add. at 5, 
emp. added.] 
Since Guaranty filed no cross-appeal from that portion of the 
court's ruling, Guaranty cannot now challenge or seek to modify 
the ruling to enlarge its own rights thereunder. See, e.g, 
Labrum v. Rickenbach, 711 P.2d 225, 227 (Utah 1985) (respondents 
cannot seek to expand easement in absence of cross-appeal); 
Mabey v. Kay Peterson Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 287, 292 (Utah 1984). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the 
district court's Ruling pertaining to the lien priority and hold 
that the architects' liens are superior to Guaranty's trust deed. 
DATED this _/£^day of May, 1988. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
By 
David M. Wahlquist 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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